Nonaligned Movement: Economy

Self-management was at the core of the identity of Yugoslav socialism and its best export. It was an outgrowth of nonalignment, the domestic expression of Yugoslavia’s aspirations to play a global role and differentiate itself from the two power blocs. Yugoslavia’s nonalignment would not have been possible without self-management and Yugoslav self-management would not have been possible without nonalignment.

With Goran Musić, Ljubica Spaskovska, and Želimir Anić. Featuring music by Five Revolutions (courtesy of Sublime Frequencies), Groupe Amnar awal Libya, and Kemal Monteno. Part 3 of 7.

Listen: “Nonaligned Movement: Economy” (Episode #108)

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Transcript: “Nonaligned Movement: Economy” (Episode #108)

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PETER KORCHNAK: This episode of Remembering Yugoslavia is brought to you by Yugoblok. 

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[JINGLE]

PETER KORCHNAK: This is Remembering Yugoslavia, the Yugoblok show exploring the memory of a country that no longer exists. I’m your general manager, Peter Korchnak.

Peaceful cooperation among independent countries was a central goal of the Nonaligned Movement, with economic development being its key component. 

For Tito’s Yugoslavia, peace, economic development, and international stability were inseparable. Already in 1956 at Brijuni the founders of the Nonaligned Movement, Josip Broz Tito, Jawaharlal Nehru, and Gamal Abdel Nasser called for “equality…disarmament, (and) international economic and financial co-operation…in accordance with the basic principles laid down in the Charter of the United Nations.” 

Among other things, the declaration of the founding meeting of the Nonaligned Movement in 1961 called for expanding the role of the United Nations, particularly in economic development. As a direct result of the summit, the UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD), an intergovernmental organization promoting the trade interests of developing countries, was established in 1964. In the 1970s, economic issues came to dominate the agenda of the Nonaligned Movement, with the focus on “collective self-reliance” and removing obstacles to economic and social development. 

Its persistent call for a new pattern of international division of labor, one based on equality among all nations, won Yugoslavia much goodwill among nonaligned countries. 

In our series on nonalignment, so far you’ve heard the history of the Nonaligned Movement and an overview of Yugoslavia’s humanitarian and military assistance to decolonization and liberation movements in the Global South. Today we’ll tackle the economic aspects of nonalignment. 

As every episode in the series, this one comes with an ad-free, extended version, featuring extra interview footage, stories, analysis, and music. These bonus extras are available exclusively to Yugoblok members. To get access and listen at Yugoblok or in your podcast listening app, go to yugoblok.com/join and sign up to be a Yugoblok member today. That’s yugoblok.com slash join.

[SOUNDBITE]

Self-Management: An Outgrowth of Nonalignment

GORAN MUSIĆ: After its break with Moscow in 1948 Yugoslavia was forced to reinvent itself and its ruling ideology. It’s supposed to justify itself, its reason d’etre, outside of Comintern, outside of [the] Moscow family of communist nations. 

PETER KORCHNAK: Goran Musić is a social historian focusing on labor issues, based in Vienna and originally from Belgrade. His dissertation and first book were on self-management in Yugoslav industries, and currently he’s researching Yugoslav self-managed enterprises operating in Zambia in the framework of nonalignment.

The East’s blockade of Yugoslavia was total; from the split to 1952, there was no trade between the Soviet Bloc countries and Yugoslavia.

GORAN MUSIĆ: It went into a period of soul searching, rereading Marxist classics and coming up with this idea of self-management, which is essential to Marxist theory, meaning that those who work in the industry, in economy have the right to decide on the major decisions which are made in this realm.

PETER KORCHNAK: Internally, the Yugoslavs concluded that the Soviet Union and its imperialistic, hegemonic policies were wrong and socialism there deformed. But they also could not quit socialism; not only was socialism a guarantee of the Communist Party’s power, to abandon socialism would have meant abandoning all they had fought for, at great cost, during World War II. So from 1949 through the early 1950s, they sought a different path. 

First, the vanguard role of the Yugoslav Communist Party was abandoned, as was the party’s very name. Instead, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia was to be “an ideological and political leading force” in the country, separate from policy implementation, which was put in the hands of various associations, from the people’s front, the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia, to trade union, youth, Partisan veterans associations, and many others. 

In the economic realm, Yugoslavia abandoned the centrally-planned, command economy model the Soviet Union was pursuing—and pushing—and introduced market socialism. The first part was about relying on markets to guide both domestic and international production and exchange. The socialist piece came from self-management, a system of workers’ control over the economy.

GORAN MUSIĆ: The Yugoslav party and communist leadership introduced these workers councils in the second half of 1949 in a kind of experimental way, looking at how they could bolster, make the efficiency of these enterprises better. 

And by 1950 this was turned into a general law on self-management, requiring each company to introduce workers councils, which were made up of workers employed by the company, the majority of which should be made of blue collar manual workers. And the idea was that this body would supervise or oversee the functioning and decisions of professional management in the company. 

PETER KORCHNAK: Self-management was the creation of the Slovenian-Yugoslav economists Boris Kidrič and Edvard Kardelj.

Tito himself was skeptical at first. Was the Yugoslav working class, still under construction primarily from peasant ranks, ready to manage itself? Was it sufficiently numerous, educated, class-conscious, and strong? It wasn’t, he concluded, but waiting wasn’t an option. Learning by doing was. Self-management would not only build the working class, it would transform it into the main political subject in the land. 

In June 1950, Tito introduced the Law on the Management of Workers Enterprises and other Economic Entities by Workers Collectives. In his speech, he reiterated that by pursuing its path, Yugoslavia continued on the original path of Marxism-Leninism, while Stalin had veered away from it. While Stalin employed the state in the service of building socialism, for Tito it was the workers who needed to be in charge. Once they succeeded, the state would wither away. 

The withering away of the state would start with its economic functions: workers would take over the management of production, and the economy would gradually be transferred from the state to workers collectives. The state would be a mere governing tool of the ruling working class. And as the workers—and later the whole society—organized into self-managing organizations and mastered ruling, the state would become unnecessary and gradually wither away. 

GORAN MUSIĆ: This idea then expanded. It became a kind of a model, a trademark of [the] Yugoslav path to socialism in the 50s, 60s and onwards. And the self-management architecture within companies was becoming more and more complex in the 60s and 70s. 

In the 70s, there was even an attempt to introduce a kind of total self-management as an alternative way to govern, not only economy, not only the enterprises, but society as a whole. Meaning, sending delegates from self-management bodies into a kind of para state bodies on communal and national level, and having them kind of create a parastate, or even withering away of the state, which was indeed the original promise of Marxist theory.

PETER KORCHNAK: Self-management evolved constantly throughout Yugoslavia’s existence, with major reforms enacted about every decade and minor changes implemented continuously.

Self-management was not only a response to the Soviet model, it also offered the Yugoslav citizenry a future-forward vision, a utopia even, something to strive for, and one that was homegrown, Yugoslav at that. 

Self-management became the main source of the Yugoslav political system’s legitimacy, according to Dejan Jović. And then some. “Self-management is a to be or not to be of our lives,” Tito said in 1966. 

Self-management represented the identity of Yugoslav socialism, indeed of Yugoslavia itself. As the CIA noted in 1969, “the idea of self-management [affected] virtually every component of Yugoslav society, and…contributed to the gradual liberalization of the country.” End quote.

Without self management, there was no Yugoslav independence, progress, socialism—without self-management, there was no Yugoslavia. 

Additionally, self-management within Yugoslavia was only possible if Yugoslavia could go its own way in developing socialism, independently, without outside interference or domination by any powers or blocs. That independence was made possibly by nonalignment. 

William Zimmerman called self-management an “outgrowth of nonalignment.” With nonalignment at the core of Yugoslavia’s foreign policy, quote, “the domestic expression of [the] aspirations [to play a global role and differentiate itself from the two blocs] was self-managing socialism.”

Or, as one of the architects of self-management, Edvard Kardelj put it, quote “[i]f it were not for its system of socialist self-management, Yugoslavia’s non-aligned position would not be possible nor would it be able to pursue is non-aligned foreign policy. And vice-versa, without the policy of non-alignment as a permanent basis and line of its activity in international relations, Yugoslavia could not successfully develop its system of socialist self-management.”

[SOUNDBITE]

Self-Management: Yugoslavia’s Greatest Export

PETER KORCHNAK: In its early decades, self-management was one of Yugoslavia’s greatest exports. Metaphorically speaking anyway.

GORAN MUSIĆ: The system of self-management was quite unique in international terms. No other country introduced something as ambitious and to that extent. 

Economy or labor is crucial when one looks at Yugoslavia at the time and its reputation in the Global South. 

PETER KORCHNAK: Yugoslavia believed that every country should go its own way without outside interference. So it did not attempt to promote its self-management system as the way, just as a way that others could take or leave. The results were to speak for themselves, and indeed they did. The early success of self-management presented to the decolonizing countries in the Global South a successful model of both kickstarting a national economy and including workers in it in a meaningful way. 

On his trips to the Global South, Tito did promote self-management to the newly decolonized countries in Asia and Africa. He praised self-management as the strongest stimulus for fast development of a modern and rational economy, citing Yugoslavia’s economic successes like longer life spans, electrification, literacy, housing, and so on. To get across the image of himself (and of Yugoslavia) as a modernizer, he would gift the leaders in Africa and Asia things like Yugoslav-made cars, film cameras, X-ray machines, mobile hospitals and ambulances, hunting rifles, color TVs, and so on.

GORAN MUSIĆ: The frame of nonalignment is crucial there, the idea that these are all countries which are underdeveloped or developing countries. Yugoslavia was insisting within the international institutions that it is a kind of a bit more developed underdeveloped country in order to present itself as being closer to countries in the Global South and being in a better position to understand their predicament. 

Yugoslavia was showcasing itself as a country which underwent rapid development after the Second World War, a country which had vast discrepancies in terms of development within its own borders, and was successfully kind of transforming largely rural, underdeveloped regions into urbanized, industrialized spaces. So it was presenting itself as being closer to the needs and specific demands of these countries than some more advanced capitalist countries. 

On the other hand, relating itself or comparing itself to larger socialist nations, you know, world powers such as [the] Soviet Union or China, the main selling point, if you wish, of Yugoslavia was that it offered this type of development assistance with no strings attached.

PETER KORCHNAK: Now self-management—

GORAN MUSIĆ: —gave a lot of autonomy to the companies themselves. So many of these companies were encouraged to go outside of Yugoslav borders, look for business partners outside. 

And many of them did that within the frame of the Nonaligned Movement and established contacts in Africa, Asia, Latin America. So if we want to talk about nonalignment, especially the economic aspect of nonalignment, it is simply impossible to neglect enterprises or self-managed companies for the simple reason that sometimes they were, in fact, the initiators of these contacts in particular contexts. 

So even though these exchanges were done within the general political frame of nonalignment of the Yugoslav state, the Yugoslav party establishing relations with political actors in the Global South, it was often indeed the directors, the management, which acted autonomously and took the initiative.

PETER KORCHNAK: The policy of nonalignment in the economic realm was from the 1960s onward largely and most tangibly implemented by Yugoslav self-managing companies. 

GORAN MUSIĆ: Before [the] mid-1960s, the main ways in which Yugoslavia offered assistance was very typical. It gave credit, it offered credit at kind of favorable conditions, with low interest rates, and it tried to act mostly through bilateral state agreements, sending kind of technical assistance through ZAMTES, the official state agency for collaboration with developing countries. So these would be mostly technical experts sent by the Yugoslav state and employed locally, who were trying to offer their know-how in this kind of bilateral, politically steered collaboration. 

PETER KORCHNAK: Zavod za međunarodnu tehničku saradnju (Institute for International Technical Cooperation, ZAMTES) facilitated technical cooperation with developing countries and coordinated foreign student stays in Yugoslavia.

GORAN MUSIĆ: What happened in mid-1960s is that Yugoslavia realized that its foreign debt is growing that its, you know, openness for trade with the rest of the world is detrimental to its trade balance, it recorded chronic deficits.

So it’s decided to change its appearance a bit and rely more on the business aspect of these contacts, and let the companies, the self-managed enterprises themselves, kind of lead the way after these initial political contacts were made, and once that trust from the other side was established. 

LJUBICA SPASKOVSKA: Understanding Yugoslav self-management is almost impossible without accounting for these companies’ global role. 

PETER KORCHNAK: Ljubica Spaskovska is a lecturer in European History at the University of Exeter, with a particular focus on Southeast Europe and recent research in nonalignment, decolonisation, and Europe–Global South relations. 

 You may also remember her from Episode 36, “Dream of the Yugoslav 80s.”

LJUBICA SPASKOVSKA: In many ways, these companies exemplified both Yugoslavia’s internal doctrine on industrial democracy, or what was called associated labor or self-management, but also what was happening in an international level, right? 

We know that in the 1960s and 70s, also, the United Nations are dedicated to both theorizing and operationalizing development at a global level. They are the UN development decades.

So we have to study these companies, these Yugoslav giants of export and international investment, or investment construction in the Global South at the intersection of this kind of both local and global developments in understanding of what the international division of labor was, how it was understood, how the North-South gap was understood, and how they were actually seeking to right this asymmetry between the Global North and the Global South, especially with Yugoslavia defining itself as a developing country. 

PETER KORCHNAK: As Spaskovska writes in a 2021 paper, “it was Yugoslavia’s leading position within the Nonaligned Movement that became instrumental to these companies’ global outreach. In the 1960s and 1970s, Yugoslavia became the center of a web of economic contacts and exchanges between the Global South, Western Europe, and the Soviet Bloc.”

Conversely, from the mid-1970s on, when the Nonaligned Movement became more economically oriented anyway, large, globally oriented self-managed Yugoslav enterprises played a huge role in the country’s goal to be an actor in international economic relations and to democratize the global economy by engaging with fellow developing countries on an equal footing and to mutual benefit. 

LJUBICA SPASKOVSKA: What Yugoslav companies were trying to do is also help newly independent countries reduce their reliance on their former colonial masters and their companies. 

All of these developing countries, including Yugoslavia, actually, what they’re asking is for a fair integration in the global economy and in trade, right? So kind of righting the asymmetries in global trade.

PETER KORCHNAK: These companies in effect also promoted self-management abroad.

LJUBICA SPASKOVSKA: Self-management and the workers councils and all the institutions and infrastructure that went with worker self-management was not, in a way, seen as standing in opposition with Western notions of efficiency, profit-making, etc. These companies did not pit welfare against profit, but in a way, they saw them as complementary. 

And that’s seen also in the way they treated workers abroad. In a way, they sought to export the Yugoslav welfare state abroad, and sometimes at dismay of Western company employees. For instance, because Yugoslav workers were paying domestic labor in African countries more than Western Europeans would pay, in a way they were, quote, unquote, spoiling the workforce. 

So the Yugoslavs that went abroad and working for these companies, they embodied kind of that Yugoslav ethos, both of the socialist welfare state, but also that particular understanding or rather impetus to get included in what they saw as kind of unjust international division of labor. 

The workforce was quite diverse. You had ordinary construction workers. There were engineers, right? There were corporate lawyers, etc, etc. So not all of them, perhaps, enjoyed the same benefits, but nevertheless, they all had the same rights, guaranteed by whatever welfare and employment guarantees they had back home. 

A sense of protection, being protected  by their employer, you know, in a sense of fair remuneration emerged as well. So a lot of them mentioned the fact that, of course, they were paid both in local but also in hard currency. So they managed to save a lot. 

PETER KORCHNAK: Let’s hear from one such worker. 

ŽELIMIR ANIĆ: My name is Želimir Anik—Anić, if you like, as it was in our country. I was born in Yugoslavia, and I’m from Yugoslavia still.

PETER KORCHNAK: Anić is from Sarajevo and early in his career he worked at Energoinvest, one of several companies that was at the forefront of Yugoslavia’s expansion into the nonaligned world as well as the Soviet Bloc. 

Established in 1951 as an industrial design office, Energoinvest developed into a major export-oriented engineering company, an umbrella for a variety of divisions and subsidiaries, from the traditional industrial sectors where it mined and processed raw materials and built industrial plants to more technologically advanced areas like engineering, software development, industrial goods, and electronics. True to its name, it was a major player in building hydroelectric and thermal power plants, as well as electric grids, including substations and transmission lines. 

Energoinvest opened its first foreign office in Cairo in 1961. 

In 1972, the New York Times called it “one of the most dynamic enterprises in socialist Yugoslavia” whose founder and CEO Emerik Blum had “a reputation for capitalist-style emphasis on efficiency and results.” 

At the time Energoinvest had 25,000 employees and offices in 31 countries. It had even hired the American consultancy McKinsey to help streamline its organization and improve its processes—that is, after a discussion with workers’ councils within the company.

By 1988, Energoinvest was the third-largest company in Yugoslavia in terms of revenue and number of employees. It was the largest exporter in Yugoslavia, with exports totalling about 1.2 billion in today’s dollars, which accounted for four percent of Yugoslavia’s annual exports. It had a workforce of 55,000, of which over 10,000 were professionals and experts like Anić.

In 1989 Energoinvest won a contract to complete the construction of and equip a wastewater treatment plant in Tripoli, Libya. 

[SOUNDBITE – “tbouritin” by Groupe Amnar awal Libya]

ŽELIMIR ANIĆ: So I spent there two years on the project, and it was [a] joint venture between Energoinvest and national Libyan company like [a] municipality.

In the offices where we worked, there were always some of the Libyan partner. They had their own staff. And you have to work with them anyway, because of the language and interfacing the different government authorities or chasing visa all this stuff.

PETER KORCHNAK: By the time Anić got to Libya, Energoinvest had a huge presence there.

ŽELIMIR ANIĆ: They were listed on 500 Forbes list.

The major advantage of Energoinvest was that besides having engineering capability, they also have a production. Primarily it was transmission lines, substations and then for thermal power plants, the big vessels. 

Energoinvest was quite present globally, meaning, you know, Middle East, North Africa, Iraq, at that time, we even had a job in Dubai at that time, Kuwait. 

PETER KORCHNAK: Cyprus, Egypt, Algeria, Sudan, Zaire, India, Indonesia, even the Soviet Union…

ŽELIMIR ANIĆ: There was close connection of the former Yugoslavia with Libya. There were lots of contracts, exchange of the goods and trades. Energoinvest basically did complete electrification of Libya. 

PETER KORCHNAK: When he went to Libya, Anić was 28, recently married and new father of a baby girl. Gigs abroad were a perk of working at Energoinvest.

ŽELIMIR ANIĆ: It’s like the company I’m working now, there are opportunities for the young engineers if they want to gain some other experience, and if they want to take that opportunity. So I basically volunteered to go there to experience something new.

I was sent there as a structural engineer to oversee the construction and to design the parts of the plant that were not constructed yet. 

PETER KORCHNAK: Tripoli was but a 90-minute flight away from Sarajevo. Later on, as Libya was under sanctions, Anić would have to fly to Malta and then undertake a 15-hour boat ride to Tripoli. 

It was worth it. Life in Libya was good for Yugoslav contractors and their families.

ŽELIMIR ANIĆ: I can say we truly enjoyed that time. The people in Libya super friendly. You know, we were walking, you know, in a Old Town, and, you know, lost the daughter. You know, you turn around and she’s just sneaked somewhere in the shop, and you kind of freak out, but the owners just call us. And you know, every time she went to a shop, she would get some dress or some some sweets, cakes, whatever.

Going to the to the fish market was really experience, such a good choice of fresh fish. And yes, you kind of have that haggle on the market. The climate was good, not so hot like in the Middle East, the food super good.

The good thing also was that all the hospitals were all free, everything was free, you didn’t have to pay anything.

PETER KORCHNAK: By the sound of it, Yugoslavs were welcome in Libya.

ŽELIMIR ANIĆ: I think we had really, really good relationship with them, because Tito gave opportunity to people from Libya to study there. Some basically studied there, returned, some stayed in Yugoslavia. There was a lots of medical staff in Libyan hospitals from Yugoslavia. It’s actually quite a lot. So there was very close relationship. 

LJUBICA SPASKOVSKA: I think it’s important to note how these employees’ or workers’ identities were shaped by their company’s global outlook. Those who had a chance to work abroad, almost assume the role of unofficial ambassadors of Yugoslavia, and they internalized the sense of geopolitical dignity that stems from Yugoslavia’s positioning in the global Cold War. So they took pride in the sense that they were recognized by, you know, their origin from Yugoslavia, or that, you know, Tito was still a recognizable figure in the countries where they were working, etc, etc. 

So there was almost like an emotional link between these former workers and the countries where they spent a few months or a few years of their life.

PETER KORCHNAK: As for the living quarters—

ŽELIMIR ANIĆ: Every company in Libya at the time lived in a compound. So there were different compounds where you had, like the villas and sometimes school, there was sport facilities, some on the beach, some not on the beach. So it was quite good. 

Very few people live[d] in a city itself, just because it wasn’t that convenient. And you had the people you know and you work and you meet all in those compounds. 

So we had the compound next to the project. It was maybe six families from Energoinvest, and then there were single, maybe in total, there were on that project, maybe 20 of us, thereabout. And there were about 100, 150 Filipino workers.

PETER KORCHNAK: Workers from Yugoslav companies socialized with their fellow Yugoslavs. 

ŽELIMIR ANIĆ: There were a few companies from Yugoslavia. I remember one was from Sarajevo, Bosna, who was construction company. And then there was big Serbian company that did the ports. There was JAT which was the air carrier from Yugoslavia, people from there and few others.

There was kind of a Yugoslavian cultural club where if you want to go out somewhere, you can go there, have a dinner, meet some people from other companies from Yugoslavia. That’s our sort of Yugoslavian embassy. 

PETER KORCHNAK: All of that went away with the Yugoslav dissolution. After Yugoslavia disintegrated and the war in Bosnia started, Anić went over to a German company and spent another two years in Libya. He and his family then moved to Canada. He now lives and works in Dubai.

In hindsight—

ŽELIMIR ANIĆ: It was kind of adventure, if you like. It was okay when you are young, you don’t mind. 

PETER KORCHNAK: In 1982, Energoinvest commissioned the late and great Kemal Monteno to create its own theme song. The lyrics not only highlighted the awesomeness of Energoinvest but also reflected Yugoslavia’s way.

“First we tamed rivers, we drew up the times that were to come. We had a bright vision and saw an era of collective power. By building factories, we built people. All our nations and nationalities knew what the work was about. 

“Our bridges, with their steel arms, have gently covered the whole globe. All the continents are now with us. 

“Energoinvest, they known your name all around the world. You proudly rise in your flight. 

“Sarajevo, Yugoslavia, Europe, the whole world! Energoinvest!”

[SOUNDBITE – “Energoinvest” by Kemal Monteno]

PETER KORCHNAK: Further south, Yugoslavia’s involvement in Zambia exemplified its economic relations with the Global South. The Belgrade-based company Energoprojekt was the principal actor in this business.

That story is in the extended episode, available to Yugoblok members. To listen, go to Yugoblok.com/Join.

PETER KORCHNAK: All this business with the Global South benefited Yugoslavia in many ways. 

GORAN MUSIĆ: First of all, depending on a country that it established relations with, if the country was able to pay in hard currencies, then Yugoslavia was definitely had a kind of very concrete, tangible, short term economic interest in doing development projects on the ground and charging them, indeed, in hard currencies, in US dollars, mostly, hence, you know, earning hard currency for its companies, having its workers earn much higher wages. And also part of this income then went into the state, the state taxed this surplus as well. 

PETER KORCHNAK: Yugoslavia also—

GORAN MUSIĆ: —hoped that it could export many of its products to the markets of the Global South. 

Yugoslav industry was booming in the sense that its output was growing in the 1960s and already then it was faced with a kind of crisis of overproduction. It was aware that in many industries it was producing more than was needed for the local markets. 

On the other hand, many industries, or most of the industries, were not competitive in Western markets, so they, or these markets, were closed for for Yugoslavia companies, and in this sense, the markets in the Global South, which were less demanding and many times more open due to good political relations, it was very savvy to try to boost trade with these countries. 

However, it was very hard for Yugoslavia as a small country, as a country which has limited infrastructural capabilities of transporting goods and services across oceans, internationally, it was quite challenging for Yugoslavia to maintain trade surpluses and kind of conquer these markets. 

PETER KORCHNAK: Indeed, it didn’t quite work out as intended. Outside of the impact of these big enterprises on the Yugoslav economy, nonalignment fell short of expectations or potential when it came to trade. Tried as it might, Yugoslavia’s trade with the Third World remained in third place after the East and West. 

In 1961, when the Nonaligned Movement was founded, Yugoslavia’s exports to the East were 30 percent of total, West 49 percent, and the Third World 21 percent; imports from those were 19, 69, and 12 percent respectively. 

Then in the 1970s there was a trend, much of it politically driven, away from trade with the West and much closer relations with the East. Additionally, global economic governance shifted away from the UN and towards the IMF and the World Bank, which further diminished the importance of the Nonaligned Movement.

In 1980, when Tito died, exports became more Easterly, at 41 percent, while the West declined to 35 percent; exports to the Global South barely budged up to 24 percent. Similarly, imports from the East grew by half to 27 percent, from the West fell to 52 percent, and from the Global South grew to 21 percent, not even double of the 1961 numbers. 

For all its nonaligned work, Yugoslavia remained economically dependent on the West for its trade, which led to huge trade deficits, while at the same time dependent on Soviet oil. 

GORAN MUSIĆ: So the biggest export of Yugoslav economy were basically engineering and construction industry services. 

So some of the most successful Yugoslavia construction companies such as Energoprojekt from Belgrade, Energoinvest being from Sarajevo, companies such as Rade Končar from Zagreb, Metalna from Maribor, they would sign contracts for these lucrative construction projects, usually infrastructural developments, things such as roads, highways, airports, city neighborhoods, dams, hydroelectric plants, military facilities, schools, and so on. 

This was the main Yugoslavia economic activity that it was known for in the Global South. 

PETER KORCHNAK: Even as Yugoslavia’s economy was tanking in the 1980s, its corporate giants were thriving. 

LJUBICA SPASKOVSKA: In the 1980s a lot of these companies, not just construction companies, but including JAT, the Yugoslavia airlines, they in a way, reach the peak in their earnings, in their global outreach and income as well from this investment opportunities abroad.

PETER KORCHNAK: Yugoslavia also enjoyed less tangible, longer term gains from all this nonaligned business.

GORAN MUSIĆ: It would be asserting itself as a kind of a player, a deal maker, a factor in global politics, somebody who could mediate in crisis situations between these countries and more powerful states and Cold War actors, such as [the] Soviet Union, such as Western Europe, the United States. 

And in this sense, it could be this liminal kind of actor, in between actor, which could offer its service and boost its international reputation.

[OUTRO MUSIC – “Jugoslavijo / Od Vardara pa do Triglava” by Horn Orchestra]

PETER KORCHNAK: That’s all for this episode of Remembering Yugoslavia, thank you for listening and doing business with us. 

All guests’ opinions expressed are solely their own; unless otherwise noted they do not express, reflect, or represent the views or opinions of any third party, including myself. 

Find additional information, sources, embeds, links, photos, and the transcript of this episode at Yugoblok.com/RememberingYugoslavia. 

While you’re there, join Yugoblok as a member and take part in a growing community of yugophiles and others, and enjoy an extended version of this episode, with extra interviews, analysis, stories, and music.

Outro music courtesy of Robert Petrić. 

Interlude music courtesy of Sticky Keys. 

“Poor Man” by Five Revolutions courtesy of Now-Again Records; “tbouritin” by Groupe Amnar awal Libya licensed under Creative Commons; “Energoinvest” by Kemal Monteno used for educational purposes under Fair Use. Buy their music!

Special thanks to Marina Anić and Paul Stubbs.

I am Peter Korchňak. 

Ćao!

Additional Sources

• Broekmeyer, Marius J. “Self-Management in Yugoslavia.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 431 (1977): 133-140
• Estrin, Saul. “Yugoslavia: The Case of Self-Managing Market Socialism.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 5, No. 4 (1991): 187-194
• Jović, Dejan. Uvod u Jugoslaviju. Zagreb: Fraktura/SKD Prosvjeta, 2023
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